Methods for robust control by Richard Dennis et al.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Working Paper 2006-10 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2006/wp06-10bk.pdf 
The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
 





Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
 
Kai Leitemo 


























 Methods for Robust Control?
Richard Dennis a;, Kai Leitemo b, Ulf S oderstr om c
aFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
bNorwegian School of Management (BI)
cSveriges Riksbank and CEPR
Abstract
Robust control allows policymakers to formulate policies that guard against model misspeci-
cation. The principal tools used to solve robust control problems are state-space methods (see
Hansen and Sargent, 2008, and Giordani and S oderlind, 2004). In this paper we show that the
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expectations can also be applied to robust control problems, with the advantage that they by-
pass the task, often onerous, of having to express the reference model in state-space form. In
addition, we show how to implement two dierent timing assumptions with distinct implications
for the robust policy and the economy. We apply our methods to a New Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium model and nd that robustness has important eects on policy
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The precision with which economic models can be expressed mathematically belies the
fact that they cannot claim to be anything more than approximations to an unknown,
and possibly unknowable, data-generating process. This unfortunate reality means that
economic decisions are inevitably made in situations where important aspects of the
environment are cloaked, hidden behind a cloud of uncertainty. While such uncertainty is
hardly welcome, it need not render decisionmakers powerless, as its eects can in principle
be mitigated through the application of robust control methods. Robust control provides
a set of tools to assist decisionmakers confronting uncertainty who are either unable or
unwilling to specify a probability distribution over possible specication errors. The
theory establishing that robust control methods can be applied to economic problems has
been developed largely in a series of contributions by Hansen and Sargent, contributions
that are well summarized in Hansen and Sargent (2008). Among other things, Hansen
and Sargent show how to set up and solve discounted robust control problems, and they
develop methods to solve for robust policies in backward-looking models and in forward-
looking models with commitment. Giordani and S oderlind (2004) extend these methods
to forward-looking models with discretion and to simple rules.
A critical component in the application of robust control is the reference model. A
reference model is a structural model, possibly arrived at through some (non-modeled)
learning process, that is thought to be a good approximation to the underlying data-
generating process. The methods described in Hansen and Sargent (2008) and Giordani
and S oderlind (2004) require that this reference model be written in a state-space form,
following the literature on traditional (non-robust) optimal control. As discussed in
Dennis (2007), while state-space methods allow models to be expressed in a form that
contains only rst-order dynamics, they also have drawbacks. In particular, many models
cannot be expressed easily in a state-space form, especially medium- to large-scale models
for which the necessary manipulations are often prohibitive.
In this paper we develop an alternative set of tools to solve robust control problems
under commitment, tools based on the solution methods developed by Dennis (2007)
that have the advantage that they do not require that the reference model be written in
a state-space form. Instead, they allow the reference model to be written in structural
form, which is more exible and generally much easier to attain. We also discuss robust
policy under two dierent timing assumptions. Under the rst assumption, policy is set
after observing the current realizations of the shocks, so only the conditional means of the
shocks are distorted. This assumption coincides with that typically used in the state-
space approach. Under the second assumption, policy is instead set before observing
the current shocks, capturing the notion that the policymaker may have doubts not
only about the reference model but also about the current state of the economy. This
assumption implies that both the conditional means and the conditional covariances of
the shocks are distorted. While the two timing assumptions give identical results under
the non-robust policy, they can have important implications for robust decision problems.
To illustrate how the structural-form solution methods work, we study robust monetary
policy in a simple New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model often used for monetary policy analysis. We show that robustness has important
implications for monetary policy and the economy, and that there are sometimes large
1dierences between the two timing assumptions.
We begin in Section 2 by describing the standard state-space method to applying
robust control and documenting the properties of the resulting equilibria. We then show
in Section 3 how robust control problems can be formulated and solved when the model
is kept in a structural form rather than expressed in a state-space form. In Section 4 we
discuss how detection-error probabilities can be calculated while allowing for distortions
to both the conditional means and covariances of the shocks, in order to determine the
size of distortions taken into consideration by the robust policymaker. In Section 5 we
apply our methods to the example economy, before concluding in Section 6.
2. Robust policymaking using state-space methods
Hansen and Sargent (2008, Ch. 16) characterize the decision problem facing a robust
Stackelberg leader who sets policy at some initial date while taking into account the
behavior of private-agent followers who make decisions sequentially. In the context of
an economy where a monopoly producer facing a competitive fringe has doubts about
its model, Hansen and Sargent describe a proposed solution. In this section, we explain
how their solution method works and, drawing on Dennis (2008), generalize it to the
standard stochastic linear-quadratic framework widely used to analyze non-robust deci-
sion problems. As Hansen and Sargent discuss, the key to analyzing robust Stackelberg
problems is to cast them in a form whereby they can be solved using the same methods
used to solve decision problems involving rational expectations.
We begin by documenting how the leader's concern for robustness, that is, its desire
to guard against model misspecication, changes its decision problem from the standard
non-robust one. Next, we show how this robust decision problem can be solved to obtain
the \worst case" and \approximating" equilibria. With the leader guarding against the
fear that its model may be misspecied, the approximating equilibrium for a robust
decision problem describes outcomes when the robust policy is implemented, but the
reference model is actually not misspecied; it represents the analog of the rational
expectations equilibrium for a non-robust decision problem. For its part, the worst-case
equilibrium, which describes outcomes according to the worst-case fears of the robust
decision maker, can usefully be viewed as a vehicle for obtaining the approximating
equilibrium.
2.1. The reference model and policy objectives
















where xt is an nx  1 vector of predetermined variables, yt is an ny  1 vector of non-
predetermined variables, ut is an nu1 vector of policy control variables, "xt  i:i:d:[0;I]
is an n"  1 (n"  nx) vector of white-noise innovations, and Et is the mathematical
expectations operator conditional upon period t information. Equation (1) describes the
2reference model, which is the model that the policymaker and private agents believe best
describes the data-generating process.
Absent a fear of misspecication, the problem for the policymaker is to choose the

















equation (1). The symmetric weighting matrices W and R are assumed to be posi-
tive semidenite and positive denite, respectively (Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and
Sargent, 1996).
Denoting by "yt+1 the expectational error "yt+1  yt+1  Etyt+1, and recognizing
that in equilibrium these expectation errors will be a linear function of the innovations,
"yt = Cy"xt, where Cy has yet to be determined, the reference model can be written in
















or, more compactly, as
zt+1 = Azt + But + C"xt+1: (4)
2.2. The distorted model
The policymaker has doubts about the reference model's adequacy as a description of
the data generating process. Specically, the policymaker fears that the reference model
may be misspecied and that a policy optimized to perform well in the reference model
might actually produce unintended and unwelcome outcomes. To acknowledge its doubts
the policymaker deliberately introduces specication errors, vt+1, which are clocked by
the innovations, and surrounds the reference model with a class of models of the form
zt+1 = Azt + But + C(vt+1 + "xt+1): (5)
Note that the specication errors, vt+1, which are dated period t+1 because they aect
outcomes in period t+1, are premultiplied by the matrix C, which contains the standard
deviations of the innovations. All else equal, therefore, shocks that are more volatile
provide greater room for misspecication.
The sequence of specication errors, fvt+1g
1






t+1vt+1  ; (6)
where  2 [0;) is a robustness parameter that summarizes the policymaker's condence
in the reference model. In the special case that  = 0, the policymaker is assumed to
have complete condence in the reference model and the non-robust decision problem is
restored.
32.3. The robust commitment problem
To guard against the specication errors that it fears, the policymaker formulates
policy subject to the distorted model with the mind-set that the specication errors will
be as damaging as possible, a view that is operationalized through the metaphor that
fvt+1g
1
0 is chosen by a ctitious evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed to
those of the policymaker. Hansen and Sargent (2001) show that the constraint problem,
in which equation (2) is minimized with respect to futg1
0 and maximized with respect to
fvt+1g1













 2 (;1), is minimized with respect to futg1
0 and maximized with respect to fvt+1g1
0 ,
subject to equation (5). The multiplier, or robustness parameter, , represents the
shadow price of a marginal relaxation of the boundedness condition (6). Larger values
for , which correspond to smaller values of , signify greater condence in the adequacy
of the reference model. In Section 4, we discuss an entropy-based method for determin-
ing , following Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) and Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent
(2003).












t+1 (Azt + But + Cvt+1 + C"xt+1   zt+1)

; (8)
where t+1 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with equation (5). Dieren-
tiating equation (8) with respect to t+1, zt, ut, and vt+1, the rst-order conditions for

















































5 = 0; (11)
@L
@vt+1





5 = 0; (12)
which hold for all t  0, with the initial conditions x0 known and y0 = 0. As Kydland
and Prescott (1980) and Currie and Levine (1985, 1993) showed, since yt is nonprede-
4termined, the Lagrange multipliers yt which are predetermined, enter the solution as
auxiliary state variables. These Lagrange multipliers encode the policy's history depen-
dence, a history dependence arising from the policymaker's commitment to its robust
policy.
Equations (9) through (12) can be solved in a variety of ways (see Anderson, Hansen,
McGrattan, and Sargent, 1996). However they are solved, on the stable manifold, the









while the decision rules are given by
yt = HW
 yt + HW
x xt; (15)
ut = FW
 yt + FW
x xt; (16)
vt+1 = KW
 yt + KW
x xt: (17)
In light of equations (13) through (15), the conjecture of Cy can be revised according








, providing the basis for an iterative procedure that, upon
convergence, yields the worst-case equilibrium. From this worst-case equilibrium, the
approximating equilibrium can be obtained; it is described by equations (13), (15), and


















where A and B have been partitioned conformably with xt, yt, and ut.
Once obtained, the approximating equilibrium can be used to construct impulse re-
sponses, to perform a variance decomposition, or to build up a likelihood function to be
used for estimation and inference, analogous to a rational expectations equilibrium.
3. Robust policymaking using structural-form methods
The solution procedure described above requires that the reference model be written in
a state-space form. For many models, however, obtaining a state-space representation can
be a lengthy and complicated process, one that opens the door to error. The diculties
are compounded in the context of robust decisionmaking because some transformations
involving the shocks and others involving the expectations operator cannot be employed,
as illustrated in Section 5. In this section, we reconsider the problem facing a robust
policymaker who sets policy with commitment while fearing model misspecication. Like
the previous section, we consider models that are linear and objectives that are quadratic.
Unlike the previous section, we follow Dennis (2007) and allow the model to be written
in a second-order structural form rather than in a state-space form. Since it is often
dicult to manipulate even medium scale models into a state-space form, the techniques
we describe enable robust decisionmaking to be applied to larger, more sophisticated,
models.
5We consider robust decisionmaking under two distinct decisionmaking environments.
In the rst environment the policymaker and private agents make decisions and deter-
mine how they will respond to shocks after observing the shocks. This environment is
consistent with Hansen and Sargent (2008, Ch. 16) and the analysis in Section 2. As an
alternative, we also consider an environment in which the policymaker and private agents
make decisions prior to observing the shocks; here the shocks can be thought of as latent
variables that are observed with a one-period delay. 1 This alternative environment is
motivated by the idea that, in addition to doubts about their reference model, agents
can have doubts about their knowledge of the state variables, doubts justied by the
fact that data are often observed with a lag and/or get revised. Although unimportant
for (linear-quadratic) non-robust decision problems, this timing assumption does have
implications for robust decision problems. Specically, where the specication errors
distort just the conditional means of the shocks when decisions are made after observing
the shocks, they distort both the conditional means and the conditional covariances of
the shocks when decisions are made prior to observing the shocks.
3.1. The reference model and policy objectives
Let the reference model be described by
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2Etyt+1 + A3ut + A4"t + A5"t+1; (19)
where yt is an n  1 vector of endogenous variables, ut is a nu  1 vector of policy
instruments, and "t is an n"  1 (n"  n) vector of innovations. 2 The matrices A0, A1,
A2, A3, A4, and A5 have dimensions conformable with yt, ut, and "t, as necessary, and
the matrix A0 is assumed to be nonsingular. We assume that the shocks, denoted st,
reside at the top of the system and that their evolution is governed by the process
st = st 1 + 
"t; (20)
where jj < 1 and the innovations are distributed according to "t  i:i:d:[0;I].
Under the assumption that agents make their decisions after observing st, the timing of






. Alternatively, under the assumption that agents make their decisions
prior to observing st, the timing of equation (20) is left unchanged and st 1 is included





and A5 = 0.







1 Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) consider robust decisionmaking in an environment where the state
is partially unobserved. In their framework, however, the full state is never observed.
2 We recycle some notation used in Section 2 (and also across the two distinct decisionmaking environ-
ments) where no confusion is likely to occur.
6where W and R are matrices containing policy weights that, as earlier, are symmetric
positive semidenite, and symmetric positive denite, respectively. 3
3.2. The distorted model
The policymaker fears that the reference model in equation (19) may be misspecied,
distorted by specication errors. Thus, rather than residing in the reference model, the
policymaker fears that itself and private agents actually reside within the distorted model.
To obtain the distorted model, we rst introduce the expectational errors, "yt+1  yt+1 
Etyt+1, which will be a linear function of the innovations in equilibrium, "yt+1 = C"t+1,
and write equation (19) in terms of realizations as
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2yt+1 + A3ut + A4"t + (A5   A2C)"t+1; (22)
where the matrix C has yet to be determined. Next, reecting the policymaker's concern
for misspecication, we surround equation (22) with a class of distorted models of the
form
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2yt+1 + A3ut + A4 (vt + "t) + (A5   A2C)(vt+1 + "t+1);(23)






tvt  ; (24)
where  2 [0;). As earlier, smaller values for  imply greater condence in the reference
model.
3.3. The robust commitment problem
To guard against the specication errors that it fears, the policymaker formulates
policy subject to the distorted model with the view that the specication errors will be
as damaging as possible. Thus, the policymaker's robust decision problem is for it to
choose futg1









subject to the distorted model in equation (23). As in Section 2, the multiplier  2
(;1) is inversely related to , and in the limit as  " 1, the specication errors become
increasingly constrained and the robust decision problem converges to the non-robust
decision problem.
Given a conjecture of C, the Lagrangian for the robust decision problem is given by
3 Penalty terms on the interaction between yt and ut could be included, but are unnecessary because












A1yt 1 + A2yt+1 + A3ut + A4 (vt + "t)
+(A5   A2C)(vt+1 + "t+1)   A0yt
i)
;
where the vector t contains the Lagrange multipliers on equation (23). 4
3.4. Shocks observed ! decisionmaking ! actions
We rst focus on the case where the shocks, st, are observed prior to decisions being
made. In this case, st enters yt 1, A4 = 0, and the policymaker and private agents
have full condence in their knowledge of the current state variables. The rst order
conditions of the Lagrangian (26) with respect to t, yt, ut, and vt+1 are
@L
@t
: A1yt 1 + A2Etyt+1 + A3ut + (A5   A2C)vt+1 + A5"t+1   A0yt = 0; (27)
@L
@yt
: Wyt + A0
1Ett+1 +  1A0
2t 1   A0
0t = 0; (28)
@L
@ut
: Rut + A0
3t = 0; (29)
@L
@vt+1
:  vt+1 + (A5   A2C)
0 t = 0: (30)









 t 1 + FW
y yt 1; (33)
vt+1 = KW
 t 1 + KW
y yt 1: (34)
To obtain the worst-case equilibrium, we update C according to C   MW
yyS, where S
is the n  n" selection matrix that picks out the columns of MW
yy associated with the
shocks (the rst n" columns when the shocks are ordered at the top of yt), iterating over
equations (27) through (34) until a x-point is reached. Note that since st is included
in yt 1 (which is why yt depends on "t+1) all of the variables in equations (31) through
(34) respond to st and hence to "t.
Given the worst-case equilibrium, which we can write as
4 Although the reference model (19) contains both "t and "t+1, we view it as an encompassing speci-
cation where in any given application either A4 or A5 will equal 0. The evil agent will thus choose vt+1
under the rst timing assumption and vt under the second, but in each case the specication errors are
chosen at t.
8zt = MWzt 1 + NW"t+1; (35)
ut = Fzzt 1; (36)







, the approximating equilibrium can be obtained by solving equation
(19) (with A4 = 0) jointly with equations (31) and (33), and can be written as
zt = MAzt 1 + NA"t+1; (38)
ut = Fzzt 1: (39)
Importantly, since the innovations "t+1 are neither observed nor realized in period







. As a consequence, while distorting
their conditional means, the worst-case specication errors do not distort the conditional
covariances of the shocks.
3.5. Decisionmaking ! shocks observed ! actions
We now turn to the environment where decisionmaking occurs prior to the shocks
being observed. As discussed earlier, when decisions are made prior to the shocks being
observed the policymaker's fears of model misspecication also manifest themselves in the
form of uncertainty about the current state of the economy. With this timing assumption,
st 1 enters yt 1, A5 = 0, and the rst order conditions of the Lagrangian (26) with
respect to t, yt, ut, and vt are
@L
@t
: A1yt 1 + A2Etyt+1 + A3ut + A4 (vt + "t)   A2CEtvt+1   A0yt = 0; (40)
@L
@yt
: Wyt + A0
1Ett+1 +  1A0
2t 1   A0
0t = 0; (41)
@L
@ut
: Rut + A0
3t = 0; (42)
@L
@vt
:  vt + A0
4t    1 (A2C)
0 t 1 = 0: (43)










 t 1 + FW
y yt 1 + FW
" "t; (46)
vt = KW
 t 1 + KW
y yt 1 + KW
" "t: (47)
In this environment, to obtain the worst-case equilibrium we update C according to
C   NW
y and iterate over equations (40) through (47) until a x-point is reached. The
worst-case equilibrium can be written as
zt = MWzt 1 + NW"t; (48)
9ut = Fzzt 1 + F""t; (49)
vt = Kzzt 1 + K""t: (50)
As earlier, the approximating equilibrium, which has the form,
zt = MAzt 1 + NA"t; (51)
ut = Fzzt 1 + F""t; (52)
can be obtained by solving equation (19) (with A5 = 0) jointly with equations (43) and
(46). Unlike in Section 3.4, here NW need not equal NA, implying that the policymaker's
fears can distort both the conditional means and the conditional covariances of the shocks.
4. Detection-error probabilities
Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) describe the concept of a detection-error prob-
ability and introduce it as a tool for calibrating , the multiplier on the misspecication
constraint, which would otherwise be a free parameter. A detection-error probability is
the probability that an econometrician observing equilibrium outcomes would make an
incorrect inference about whether the approximating equilibrium or the worst-case equi-
librium generated the data. The intuitive connection between  and the probability of
making a detection error is that when  is small, greater dierences between the distorted
model and the reference model (more severe misspecications) can arise, which are more
easily detected. In this section, we extend the detection-error approach to calibrating
 to the case where the specication errors distort both the conditional means and the
conditional covariances of the shocks.
Let A and W denote two models. With a prior that assigns equal weight to each






where prob(AjW) (prob(WjA)) represents the probability that the econometrician erro-
neously chooses model A (model W) when in fact model W (model A) generated the
data. Let model A denote the approximating model and model W denote the worst-case
model, then any sequence of specication errors that satises the boundedness condition
in equation (24) will be at least as dicult to distinguish from the approximating model
as is a sequence that satises equation (24) with equality. As such, p() represents a
lower bound on the probability of making a detection error.
To calculate a detection-error probability we require a description of how the econome-
trician goes about choosing one model over another. Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002)
assume that this model selection is based on the likelihood ratio principle. Let fzW
t gT
1
denote a nite sequence of economic outcomes generated according to the worst-case
equilibrium, model W, and let LAW and LWW denote the likelihood associated with
models A and W, respectively. Then the econometrician chooses model A over model W
if log(LWW=LAW) < 0. Generating M independent sequences fzW
t gT
1 , prob(AjW) can




















AW) < 0] is the indicator function that equals one when its argu-
ment is satised and equals zero otherwise; prob(WjA) is calculated analogously using
draws generated from the approximating model. The likelihood function that is generally
used to calculate prob(AjW) and prob(WjA) assumes that the innovations are normally
distributed.
Although the theory of detection does not require that the evil agent distort only the
conditional means of the innovations, and not the conditional covariances, existing meth-
ods to calculate detection-error probabilities do (see Hansen, Sargent, and Wang, 2002,
for example). To calculate detection-error probabilities while accounting for distortions
to both the conditional means and the conditional covariances of the shocks, let
zA
t = MAzA
t 1 + NA"t; (55)
zW
t = MWzW
t 1 + NW"t; (56)
govern equilibrium outcomes under the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case
equilibrium, respectively. When NA 6= NW, to calculate p() we must rst allow for
the stochastic singularity that generally characterizes equilibrium, and second account
appropriately for the Jacobian of transformation that enters the likelihood function.
Using the QR decomposition we decompose NA according to NA = QARA and NW
according to NW = QWRW. By construction, QA and QW are orthogonal matrices














; fi;jg 2 fA;Wg; (57)





















































b AjW   b WjW

; (59)
where \tr" is the trace operator.
When NA = NW (which is the case when the distortions aect only the conditional
means of the shocks) it follows that RA = RW and the Jacobian of transformations
associated with the various likelihoods cancel and play no role in the calculations. Con-
























b AjW   b WjW

; (61)
which are equivalent to the expressions that Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) and
Hansen and Sargent (2008, Ch. 9) employ. Given equations (58) and (59), equation
11(54) is used to estimate prob(AjW) and prob(WjA), which are needed to construct the
detection-error probability, as per equation (53). The multiplier  is then determined
by selecting a detection-error probability (or at least its lower bound) and inverting
equation (53). Generally this inversion is performed numerically by constructing the
mapping between  and the detection-error probability for a given sample size.
5. Robust monetary policy: An application
We now study the eects of robustness from the perspective of a central bank that
has doubts about its model. We analyze a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model of the type commonly used for modern monetary policy anal-
ysis. This model model is dicult to analyze using state-space methods, as consumption
habits introduce expectations of future shocks. The model is however easily analyzed
using the structural-form solution methods described above.
The model includes three types of agents: rms, households, and a central bank. Firms
produce dierentiated goods in a monopolistically competitive environment using labor
as the only production factor and set prices to maximize prots subject to a downward-
sloping demand curve. Following Calvo (1983), rms set prices in a staggered fashion,
so only a subset of rms set their price optimally in every period, and as in, for instance,
Smets and Wouters (2003), the remaining rms index their price to past ination. Let
b t denote the one-period rate of ination, mct denote real marginal cost,  2 (0;1)
denote the subjective discount factor, 1    2 (0;1) denote the probability for a rm to
reoptimize its price in a given period, ! 2 [0;1] denote the degree of indexation, and "p;t
denote an exogenous markup shock, that is, a disturbance to the elasticity of substitution
across dierent varieties of goods. Log-linearizing the denition for the aggregate price
level and the rst order condition for optimal price setting around a steady state with








(1   )(1   )
(1 + !)
mct + "p;t: (62)
Households choose consumption, labor supply, and holdings of a one-period nominal
bond to maximize the expected present value of a utility function that is additively
separable in consumption and leisure. In order to capture inertia in consumption, the
utility function allows for internal habit formation, so households value consumption
relative to their past consumption. Let yt denote aggregate output, b {t denote the one-
period nominal interest rate,  > 0 denote the coecient of relative risk aversion,  2
[0;1) quantify the importance of habits, and "b;t denote an exogenous preference shock.
The optimal intertemporal consumption decision coupled with the resource constraint




1 +  + 2
yt 1 +
1 +  + 2
1 +  + 2
Etyt+1  





 (1 +  + 2)
[(1   )(b {t   Etb t+1)   "b;t + (1 + )Et"b;t+1   Et"b;t+2];
see Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005).
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where  > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and "z;t is an exogenous
shock to labor productivity.
The three shocks are assumed to follow the stationary autoregressive processes
"j;t = j"j;t 1 + jj;t; j = p;b;z; (65)
where j 2 [0;1), j  0, and j;t are i:i:d: innovations with zero mean and unit variance.
We parameterize the model with coecient values that correspond to a quarterly
frequency. For the coecients in the rm's price-setting problem, we set the discount
factor  to 0:99, the Calvo probability  to 0:75, and the degree of price indexation ! to
1=3. In regard to household preferences, we set the coecient of relative risk aversion 
to 2:0, the habit parameter  to 0:8, and the inverse of the labor supply elasticity  to
2:5. For simplicity, the three shocks are all assumed to have an autoregressive parameter
of 0:5 and an innovation standard error of 1:0.
The model is closed by assuming that the central bank sets the (annualized) one-


















where t  4b t and it  4b {t are the rate of ination and the nominal interest rate
expressed in annualized terms, y
f
t is the level of output in the exible-price equilibrium
(without markup shocks), and ; > 0 summarize the central bank's preferences for
stabilizing the output gap, yt   y
f
t , and the interest rate relative to ination.
We set the central bank preferences for output gap and interest rate stabilization to
 = 0:5 and  = 0:05, respectively. The concern for misspecication, , is chosen so that
the detection-error probability is 0:2, using 1;000 simulations of a sample of 200 periods.
This implies  = 33:3 when only the conditional means are distorted and  = 20:9 when
both the conditional means and covariances are distorted.
Figures 1{3 show the responses of ination, the output gap, real marginal costs, and
the nominal interest rate to one-standard-deviation innovations in the three shocks. Each
panel displays the responses according to the rational expectations equilibrium and the
approximating equilibria from the two modeling assumptions, where policy is set after
observing the shocks (so conditional means are distorted) and where policy is set before
observing the shocks (so also conditional covariances are distorted).
Figure 1 presents the responses following a technology shock. The innovation to tech-
nology raises the marginal productivity of labor and thereby lowers real marginal costs.
The innovation also raises both output and the exible-price level of output, however,
due to sticky prices, the latter rises more than the former, opening up a negative output
13gap. Through the Phillips curve, the reduction in marginal costs asserts downward pres-
sure on ination and with ination and the output gap both below baseline the policy
response is to lower the nominal interest rate. Ination, the output gap, and marginal
costs then return to steady state after a period of over-shooting.
||| Insert Figure 1 around here |||
When the central bank has doubts about the model and sets policy after observing
the shock, it fears that the technology shock is more persistent than under rational
expectations, and that the positive technology shock is associated with negative future
shocks to preferences and the price markup. As such developments would lead to a more
negative output gap and lower ination, the robust central bank reduces the interest rate
more than with rational expectations. As a consequence, ination, the output gap, and
marginal cost are all higher in future periods with the robust policy. The central bank
that sets policy before observing the shock fears that the shock, as well as being more
persistent, also has a larger contemporaneous eect on the economy. The robust policy
is therefore again to reduce the interest rate more than with rational expectations, but
the time prole of the interest rate response is less expansionary than when the central
bank sets policy after observing the shocks.
Since the optimal policy is to accommodate the technological innovation, it is not
surprising that the responses for the three equilibria are all quite similar. The greatest
dierence among the three sets of responses resides in the behavior of the nominal inter-
est rate. With the additional distortions hidden by the consumption preference shock
representing a serious concern for the robust central bank (see below), in the equilib-
rium where only conditional means of shocks are distorted the central bank responds
to the lower output gap with a looser monetary policy, accepting higher ination as a
consequence.
Figure 2 displays the responses to a one-standard-deviation preference shock. Looking
at the results for the rational expectations equilibrium, due to an increase in labor supply
real marginal costs rst decline following the shock, but then increase. This response
leads to a small increase in ination and a small positive output gap opens up (since
output rises by slightly more than ex-price output). The central bank expands monetary
policy to counter the increase in ination, and this policy response reduces marginal costs,
ination and the output gap.
||| Insert Figure 2 around here |||
The robust central bank fears that the preference shock has a larger impact on ination,
output and marginal costs in the short term, and therefore increases interest rates more,
in particular when the central bank sets policy after observing the shocks, and so fears
distortions to the conditional means only. This result is due to the presence of expected
future preference shocks, which are aected by conditional-mean distortions, but not by
conditional-variance distortions, and that, due to the interest rate stabilization motive,
are not easily oset by the robust central bank. Nevertheless, the responses of ination,
the output gap, and marginal costs to the preference shock are all small relative to the
other shocks.
Figure 3 shows the responses to a price markup shock. As expected, the markup shock
causes ination to rise, and the central bank responds by tightening monetary policy. The
increase in the interest rate opens up a negative output gap and lowers real marginal
costs. For this shock, the greatest dierence between the rational expectations responses
and the approximating equilibrium responses resides in the behavior of ination and the
14nominal interest rate. The robust policies imply higher interest rates and slightly lower
ination than the rational expectations policy. At the same time, for this shock, as
for the technology and the preference shock, dierences in behavior between the various
equilibria are relatively small, and are observed most obviously in the interest rate itself.
||| Insert Figure 3 around here |||
Table 1 reports the unconditional variances of key variables in the model and the value
of the loss function in equation (66). As suggested by the impulse responses, the robust
policies typically lead to more volatility in the interest rate and ination, in particular
when the central bank sets policy after observing the shocks. Panel (b) shows that under
this policy the worst-case and approximating equilibria imply a large deterioration in
performance compared with the case of rational expectations, with loss rising by 56
and 49 percent, respectively. In contrast, when the central bank sets policy without
knowledge of the current shocks, in panel (c), loss is 21 percent higher in the worst-case
equilibrium and just 2.1 percent higher in the approximating equilibrium. Clearly, for
the same detection-error probability, distortions to the conditional means of the shocks
are of considerable concern while distortions that raise the volatility of the innovations
are less so. As explained above, this result is mainly driven by the expectations of
future preference shocks that are aected by conditional-mean distortions, but not by
conditional-variance distortions. 5
||| Insert Table 1 around here |||
Turning to the eects that robustness has on macroeconomic volatility in the approx-
imating equilibrium, when the robust decision is made prior to observing the shocks
in panel (c), the central bank's desire for robustness raises the variances of all of the
macroeconomic variables that we consider, with the exception of ination. In this re-
spect, the desire for robustness acts similarly to a fall in the relative weight assigned
to output gap stabilization, . For the case where the robust decision is made subse-
quent to observing the shocks in panel (b), the variance of output, the output gap, and
real marginal costs|the three variables whose equations contain expectations of future
shocks|all fall, while the variance of ination and the nominal interest rate rise. Here
the robust central bank designs its policy to guard against distortions hidden by the pref-
erence shocks, which have important eects through the shock's expectation structure,
accepting greater interest rate and ination volatility as a consequence.
6. Final comments
In this paper we show how structural-form solution methods can be applied to solve
robust control problems, thereby making it easier to analyze complex models using ro-
bust control methods. As an additional contribution, we show that, upon departing from
rational expectations, dierent assumptions regarding the timing of decisionmaking rel-
ative to the realization of shocks can have a material impact on the robust decision rule.
Specically, if the shocks are realized prior to decisions being made, then the worst-case
specication errors distort the conditional means of the shock process distortions whereas
if the shocks are realized subsequent to decisions being made, then the worst-case spec-
ication errors distort both the conditional means and the conditional covariances of
5 Excluding the expected future preference shocks from the model makes distortions to the conditional
means and variances more costly than those to only the conditional means.
15the shocks. To accommodate distortions to the conditional volatility of the shocks, we
generalize the existing method for calculating detection-error probabilities.
We illustrate the structural-form solution methods by applying them to a business cycle
model of the genre widely used to study monetary policy under rational expectations. A
key nding from this exercise is that the strategically designed specication errors will
tend to distort the Phillips curve in an eort to make ination more persistent, and hence
harder and more costly to stabilize. The optimal response to these distortions is for the
central bank to become more activist in its response to shocks. Finally, with the business
cycle model serving as a laboratory, we show that the distortions to the conditional
volatility of the shocks have implications for monetary policy and for economic outcomes
that are both qualitatively and quantitatively important.
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17Table 1
Unconditional variances and value of loss function in New Keynesian model
Var(t) Var(yt) Var(yt   yn
t ) Var(mct) Var(it) Loss
(a) Rational expectations
0.769 0.158 0.066 12.638 13.588 1.444
(b) Conditional means distorted
WO 1.032 0.148 0.068 12.587 25.109 2.255
AP 1.015 0.156 0.065 12.357 23.216 2.147
(c) Conditional means and covariances distorted
WO 0.902 0.192 0.077 13.720 17.695 1.776
AP 0.722 0.166 0.071 13.220 15.185 1.475
This table reports the unconditional variances and the value of the loss function (66) in the New Key-
nesian model in (a) the rational expectations equilibrium with the non-robust policy; (b) the worst-case
and approximating equilibria when the conditional means of the shocks are distorted (policy set after
observing the shocks); and (c) the worst-case and approximating equilibria when the conditional means
and covariances of the shocks are distorted (policy set before observing the shocks).
18Fig. 1. Impulse responses to technology shock in the New Keynesian model


















Mean and variance distorted










































This gure shows the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation technology shock in
the New Keynesian model in (i) the rational expectations equilibrium with the non-robust
policy; (ii) the approximating equilibrium when the conditional means of the shocks are
distorted (policy set after observing the shocks); and (iii) the approximating equilibrium
when the conditional means and covariances of the shocks are distorted (policy set before
observing the shocks).
19Fig. 2. Impulse responses to preference shock in the New Keynesian model
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This gure shows the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation preference shock in
the New Keynesian model in (i) the rational expectations equilibrium with the non-robust
policy; (ii) the approximating equilibrium when the conditional means of the shocks are
distorted (policy set after observing the shocks); and (iii) the approximating equilibrium
when the conditional means and covariances of the shocks are distorted (policy set before
observing the shocks).
20Fig. 3. Impulse responses to price markup shock in the New Keynesian model
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This gure shows the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation price markup shock
in the New Keynesian model in (i) the rational expectations equilibrium with the non-
robust policy; (ii) the approximating equilibrium when the conditional means of the
shocks are distorted (policy set after observing the shocks); and (iii) the approximating
equilibrium when the conditional means and covariances of the shocks are distorted
(policy set before observing the shocks).
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